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2Over the last century and a half aggregate economic activity in Spain experienced a 43-fold
increase, growing at 2.5 percent per year, and per capita GDP was 16 times larger than in 1850
implying an annual rate of 1.9 percent.1 GDP per hour worked expanded at a faster rate (2.1
percent) as hours of work per person declined. This economic growth, however, did not take place
at a steady rate. During the Golden Age (1950-74) per capita GDP rose seven times faster than in
the previous hundred years, and twice as fast as during the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Does factor accumulation or productivity improvement -“abstention” or “ingenuity” to use D.N.
McCloskey words- account for it?2 In fact, no consensus has emerged about the relative importance
of the contributions of factor accumulation and total factor productivity (TFP) to GDP growth, nor
do we know whether a temporal sequence can be established for their relative contributions to
growth.3 Susan Collins and Barry Bosworth have suggested that, in its early stages, growth is
primarily associated with capital accumulation, while TFP only emerges above a certain
1 In order to make the comparison between GDP and factor inputs consistent (see expression (4) below), a
new Translog index has been constructed for real GDP on the basis of current values and quantity indices for
the four main sectors of economic activity (agriculture, industry, construction, and service) provided in
Prados de la Escosura, Progreso. The new Translog index exhibits a slightly faster growth than the chain
Laspeyres index used in Prados de la Escosura, Progreso.
2 McCloskey, “Industrial Revolution”.
3 Cf. Crafts, British Economic Growth, and Mokyr, “New Economic History”, on the case of Britain and
Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ, pioneering study on Western Europe (but not including Spain) and the
U.S. in the post-World War II era. On developing countries, including and some comparisons with post-
World War II Europe, see Krugman, “Myth”; Young, “Tyranny”; Collins and Bosworth, “Economic
Growth”; Crafts, “East Asian Trend Growth”, and Bosworth and Collins, “Empirics of Growth”.
3development threshold.4 Studying the sources of Spain’s growth over one hundred and fifty years
provides an unusual opportunity to explore these issues.5
Spain’s long-run economic growth can be depicted as trend stationary with structural breaks
in 1936 - a shift to a lower level as a consequence of the Civil War (1936-39)- and, in trend, in 1951
and 1975 (Figure 1), establishing three long periods: 1850-1950, 1951-74, and 1975-2000 (Table 1,
Panel A).6 Long swings in which rates of variation differ from its long-run trend as a result of shifts
in economic policies, access to international markets and technological change are also exhibited in
Spanish economic performance (Panel B).7
FIGURE 1]
[TABLE 1]
4 Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth”, p. 186.
5 Unfortunately, detailed growth-accounting exercises with long-run evidence are rare. See, for example,
Maddison, “Growth and Slowdown”; Matthews et al., British Economic Growth; Carré et al., French
Economic Growth; and Kendrick, Productivity, and Abramovitz and David, Two Centuries, for the United
States.
6 Prados de la Escosura, “Growth”. A change of trend indicates a break in the long-term rate of growth while
a change in level represents an increase or, as in the case of the Civil War years, a drop in economic activity
that does not alter the trend growth rate. A distinction should be made between the trend growth rate and the
GDP level, the former being the relevant one to establish a periodization. Thus, the pertinent fact for
accepting a structural break in 1951 is that the trend growth rate changed after this year and not that the GDP
level was lower in 1951 than in 1929.
7 The phases or long swings defined in Table 1 correspond with the time division arising from
econometrically estimated deviations from the established trend (Prados de la Escosura, “Growth”). Growth
rates are measured as average annual logarithmic rates of change over periods delimited by peak years.
4We use a growth accounting approach allows to decompose this long-run growth into the
contribution of production factors in terms of quantityand efficiency.8 The sources of Spain’s growth
have changed dramatically since 1850. Broad capital accumulation and TFP growth appear
complementary in Spain’s long-term growth and our results for Spain confirm Collins and Bosworth’s
finding of low TFP growth for countries in their early stages of development.9 Factor accumulation
dominated long-run growth up to 1950, while efficiency gains led thereafter and, especially, during
periods of growth acceleration. The main spurts in TFP and capital correspond to the impact of the
railroad (1850s-80s), the electrification (the 1920s and 1950s) and the adoption of new vintage
technology during the Golden Age.
The rest of the paper is divided into three parts. Section II describes the reduced form of
Jorgenson’s growth accounting adopted in this paper and presents our new database, which comprises
new estimates of GDP, and the stock and input of capital and labor, over one-and-a-half centuries.
Then, in Section III, we discuss with alternative growth-accounting measures, the role of TFP and
factor accumulation in GDP and labor productivity growth. We conclude with some remarks and a
research suggestion.
THE ‘PROXIMATE’ SOURCES OF GROWTH: METHODS AND SOURCES
Growth accounting is “a means of allocating observed output growth between the contributions
of changes in factor inputs and a residual, total factor productivity, which measures a combination of
8 This framework does not include a particular growth theory since it only provides a descriptive procedure
and it is, therefore, compatible with the alternative specifications of different growth models (Barro, “Growth
Accounting”; Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth”, p. 139). In this paper, we make a historical
adaptation of Domar’s, “Measurement of Technological Change”, and Griliches and Jorgenson’s,
“Explanation of Productivity Change”, approach to measure factor inputs in terms of quality.
9 As Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth”, p. 164, point out, technical advances might be embodied in
new capital while increasing TFP might induce greater capital accumulation by raising the returns to capital.
5changes in efficiency in the use of those inputs and changes in technology.”10 In the growth accounting
approach favored by Jorgenson, superlative indices are used, as well as heterogeneous measures of
factor inputs that make it possible to separate their contribution to growth into quantityand
composition changes.11
a) The Translog Index of Total Factor Productivity
The point of departure for our estimate of the sources of long-run growth in Spain is the
production function given by:
(1) ),,( LKXF=Q
In which output (Q) is as function of land (X), capital(K), and labor (L) inputs.
Specifically:
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Θi denotes the elasticity of output with respect to each input.12 Under the assumptions of perfect
competition and constant returns to scale these elasticities are equivalent to the share of inputs in total
10 Bosworth and Collins, “Empirics of Growth”, p. 114.
11 As a consequence, a reduction in the ‘unexplained residual’ or total factor productivity can occur as the
‘residual’ no longer includes composition (“quality”) changes in inputs. See Jorgenson, “Productivity”. It is
worth noting that Jorgenson’s approach resembles but has striking differences with that of Denison, Sources.
More specifically, Denison also cross-classified hours worked by workers’ attributes and weighted them by
wage rates. However, ignoring the heterogeneity among components of capital input, he did not cross-
classified capital by type of asset and weighted it by rental rates like Jorgenson did. As Jorgenson,
“Productivity”, points out, this violated the equilibrium conditions for growth accounting analysis.
12 See Christensen et al. “Transcendental Logarithmic”.
6factor payments. Weights are, then, given by the average share of each component in the total outlay
for the two periods.13 Under constant returns to scale, the values of factor shares sum to unity.14 The
Translog index of TFP (TFPt-1,t) is the difference between the growth rate of output and a weighted
average of the growth rates of factor inputs.
The rate of growth of output and of each input i between two periods is a weighted average of
the growth rates of its n components.15 The respective equations for output, land,capital, and labor are:
(4) )]lnQi-lnQi([=lnQ-lnQ 1-ttQi1-tt i
(5) )]ilnX-lnXi([=lnX-lnX 1-ttLi1-tt i
(6) )]lnCi-lnCi([=lnK-lnK 1-ttKi1-tt i
(7) )]lnLi-lnLi([=lnL-lnL 1-ttLi1-tt i
Where share values are computed as:
(8) .1,..i,..n)=(i1)],-(t+(t)1/2[= ninin i 
b) Capital input
We develop our measure of capital input, which is an index number of the flow of services
provided by the stock of capital in three successive phases.16 First, we construct the stock of capital.17
13 Total outlay is practically equivalent to the total payments received for outputs. However, in some cases,
these payments can be adjusted for direct taxation and monopoly gains to obtain the total outlay (that would
reduce the share of capital in total payments and, hence, increase the rate of TFP growth). We make no
adjustments here and assume that total outlay is equivalent to total payments.
14 The Translog Index offers a justification for using variable shares and for adjusting production factors according
their social product. See Jorgenson, “Productivity”.
15 Weights are given by the share of each component in the corresponding payments for each input.
16 As it is usually assumed, capital input (K) in year t is proportional to the stock of capital C at the beginning
of the period t. Thus, K t =· C t-1, where the constant () transforms the capital stock into its services, and
7Second, we estimate the rental price of capital (or price of capital services) and the total returns to
capital (the value of capital services). Finally, we weight the quantityof each asset by its share in the
total returns to capital to derive a single capital input index.
Since the amount of new additions to the stock of capital (investment, It) is directly
observable while the stock, Ct, is not, we need to infer the stock of capital (C) for the year t from the
accumulation of investment (I) in past years, taking into account that a part of the stock is retired
when obsolete. Using the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM), the stock of capital in the year t (Ct) is
equal to the weighted sum of the investment realized during this same year and the previous ones
where each generation of capital is weighted by its depreciation rate in period t,18
(9) Ct = (1 -t) C t-1 + It
Thus, the capital stock C in year t is equal to the amount of capital in year t-1 multiplied by
1 minus the depreciation rate () of the year t, plus the gross fixed capital formation, I, during the
year t.19 The depreciation rate is=X / T, where X is a parameter20 (declining balance) and T is the
where the capital stock C tmoves according to the new investments, at constant prices, during the year, and to
the depreciation and replacement rates. Cf. Jorgenson, “Productivity”.
17 We define the stock of capital as all tangible goods that can be used during more than one period to produce
other goods and services. More specifically, the capital stock comprises residential and non-residential structures,
transport equipment, and producer durable equipment (machinery and equipment).
18 This is the case under the following assumptions: (1) all durable goods bought in a certain period t form a
vintage of capital; (2) the services produced for different vintages of capital in period t are perfect
substitutes; and (3) their services are proportional to the initial investment. See Hulten, “Measurement of
Capital”.
19 The use of the PIM method requires, thus, (1) an initial benchmark for the stock of capital; (2) historical
series of Gross Fixed Capital Formation by types of assets, at constant prices; and (3) the efficiency of each
vintage of capital.
20 The parameter X is, according to Hulten and F. Wykoff, “Economic Depreciation”, 1.65 for machinery and
equipment, and 0.91 for buildings and structures. The values of the parameter were derived from a careful
8life of each type of asset.21 This method generates a measure of capital that takes into account the
productive capacity of each component and, hence, measures capital stock in efficiency units.22
The second step in developing measures of capital input is to construct rental prices for each
category. In competitive equilibrium, the cost of producing a unit of capital is equal to its price and
the expected rent during its life. Assuming that old and new vintages of capital are perfect
substitutes23, the rental price of capital, pk, in year (t), can be estimated as24:
(10) 1)]-(tp-(t)p[-(t)p+1)r(t)-(tp=(t)p iiiik 
Where pi is the investment price of the capital good i, r is the nominal rate of return, andδi is the
depreciation rate for the capital good i. The rental price of capital is, thus, the sum of return per unit
of capital, 1)r(t)-(tpi , depreciation, (t)p i , and the negative of revaluation, 1)]-(tp-(t)p[ ii .25
econometric exercise in which a large data base was used. Accepting the X parameter’s values from Hulten
and Wykoff , “Economic Depreciation”, for historical purposes is arbitrary. Nonetheless, it is worth noting
that these parameters have been widely employed in empirical studies as they correspond to the
technological frontier to which countries tend to converge.
21 This ‘modified’ geometric depreciation pattern is somewhere in between the arithmetic and geometric
depreciation patterns (that is, it moves between one and two times the inverse of asset lives). Cf. Jorgenson,
“Productivity”. For Spain, the alternative assumptions of X = 1 (arithmetic depreciation) and X = 2
(geometric depreciation) do not cast significantly different results for the stock of capital (Appendix, Table
A-1).
22 Hulten, “Measurement of Capital”. Alas, in our historical exercise we do not fully succeed in measuring
the capital stock in efficiency units, as we cannot carry out a deeper de-aggregation by type of asset, thus,
fail to capture all the composition -or ‘quality’- changes.
23 Jorgenson, “Productivity”.
24 Hall and Jorgenson, “Tax Policy”
25 Jorgenson, “Capital”, p. 10. It should be noted that we have already established the depreciation rates and
the prices of acquisition of capital for Spain but we do not know the rates of return. There are two methods
for estimating rates of return (r). The first uses the long-run interest rate as equivalent to the competitive
9Total returns to capital are, then, obtained, as the product of the rental price of capital by the
quantity of capital stock, and it is equal to capital property compensation. This way we can derive
the share of each type of asset in the total returns to capital that will be used as weights in the
computation of the capital input index. It can be observed that a capital good with a higher
amortization rate receives a larger weight in the index of capital input (machinery is, for example,
allocated a higher weight than dwellings). The implication is that changes in the stock composition
from long duration (and low rate of return) to short duration (and high rate of return) capital goods
represent an increase in the quality of capital. The final step is to construct a capital input index by
combining the quantity of each asset with its share in the total returns to capital as in expression (6).
The ratio between the capital input and the capital stock provides a measure of the capital’s
composition changes or ‘quality’ of capital. However, the idea that technological change embodied
in capital is captured by increases in the ‘quality’ of capital lacks consensus and has been rejected
by Alwyn Young and Moses Abramovitz and Paul David who consider that technological progress
embodied in capital will appear in the ‘residual’.26
Data on yearly investment (quantities and prices) by type of asset are taken from Prados de la
Escosura.27 Three different epochs (1850-1913, 1914-1958, and 1959-2000), with their particular
benefit rate. The second derives the rate of return from the share of national income received by the owners
of capital assets as a compensation for their property that can be obtained by solving equation (9). The
difference between the two estimations represents monopolistic competition rents.
26 For example, Young, “Tyranny of Numbers”, p. 649, claimed that as each type of input i is assumed to be
identical over time, any increases in the efficiency of such input will appear in the ‘residual’. Abramovitz
and David, Two Centuries, p. 23, warned us that “when we speak of the growth of Capital Quality, we do not
refer to the important changes in the characteristics of capital goods which raise their productivity but are the
result of technological progress. That effect, for which there are no direct measures, remains embedded in the
TFP residual.” For a less skeptic view, see Hulten, “Measurement of Capital”, p. 134; and “Growth
Accounting”. Our historical estimates fit in the case exposed by Young.
27 Prados de la Escosura, Progreso.
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asset lives, are considered for ‘productive’ capital (that is, for all capital assets except residential
dwellings). 28 This is due to the fact that assets lives tend to shorten as one gets closer to the present.
An additional difficulty was to establish the initial level of capital stock (C0) for each type of
asset j in our PIM estimate. We derived this initial stock by assuming that the growth rate of
investment during the first decade of the time span considered, that is, the 1850s, was representative
of the growth rate of investment prior to 1850.29 Algebraically:
(11) C0j = I0j / (+ g),
Where C is the capital stock, I the investment rate,the depreciation rate, and g the rate of
variation between 1850/54 and 1855/59 for each type of asset j. However, it seems plausible that the
growth of investment was significantly slower before the 1850s (the decade in which the railroad
was introduced in Spain) and we have consequently assumed that the initial capital stock would
have been twice as high the figure derived from this computation.30
28 For each type of capital assets its life was established from available information. The assumed lives for
different types of assets are in line with those used in major historical works (Feinstein, “Sources and
Methods”, for the U.K., and Jorgenson, “Capital”, for the U.S.) and tend to be on the conservative (high) side
when compared with available studies for late 20th century Spain. Further details on the construction of
capital measures are provided in Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Physical Capital”, where capital
estimates were derived assuming alternatively longer (shorter) assets lives. Also alternative estimates of
(gross and net) capital stock constructed using arithmetic depreciation rates are provided. The main trends in
capital stock and input offered here are robust to these alternative estimates.
29 Baigés et al. Economía española and Young, “Tyranny of Numbers”.
30 This correction in the initial assumption (11) reduces the contribution of capital to GDP growth and,
hence, increases that of TFP. Nonetheless, the effect of the assumption about the initial capital stock fades
away over time. Actually alternative capital stock series constructed by assuming the one resulting from
expression (11), double such level (our preferred estimate), and zero initial capital, converge by 1890
(Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Physical Capital”).
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Finally, we have chosen to approximate the competitive benefit rate with the long-run
interest rate. The internal return of private liabilities, used as a proxy for the long-term interest rate
since 1964, comes from the MOISSES and BDMORES databases31 , while the corporate rates of
return32 were employed for 1880-1954 and the net rate of return on public debt for 1850-1880.33
Figure 2 and Table 2 present the evolution of capital stock and input from 1850 to 2000.
[FIGURE 2]
Capital input and stock do not follow a steadypath as Figure 2 and Table 2, Panel A, show.
Expansion was more intense during the Golden Age but no returning to the pre-1950 path of growth
thereafter. Different phases of growthcan be distinguished that, with the exception of the decade of
transition to democracy(1975-85), match GDP performance (Table 2, Panel B).34 An initial period of
intense growth up to the early 1880s, slowed down until World War I, resumed in the 1920s, and was
interrupted during from the 1930s to the early 1950s. Since the early 1950s capital accumulation grew
at a faster and steadier pace, with a big spurt in the years 1959-74.
[TABLE 2]
Changes in the composition of capital by type of asset from residential construction toward
productive capital (machinery and equipment) (Figure 3) increased the services provided by the capital
stock to production and reflected in the growing gap between the growth rates of capital input and
stock (the so-calledquality of capital) that rose in phases of fast capital growth (Table 2, col. 3 and
31 Dabán et al., “base de datos”.
32 Tafunell, “Rentabilidad financiera”.
33 Tafunell, “Empresa y bolsa”.
34 Table A-1 in the Appendix offers the growth rates corresponding to gross and net capital stock obtained
with arithmetic depreciation rates (1/T) but accepting the same assets lives used in the capital stock series
obtained with modified depreciation rates (Table 2). These alternative estimates share the main trends
described here.
12
Figure 4).35 Three periods stand out in which capital quality grew above the long run trend: from the
mid-1850s to the early 1880s, a period of opening up in which foreign capital was invested in the
railroads construction and in mining; the 1920s, that witnessed another episode of foreign capital
inflow and the electrification of Spanish industry; and the Golden Age (1953-74), in which Spain
completed electrification and replaced the old vintage capital after two decades of international
isolation due to the Great Depression, the Civil War (1936-39) and the inward looking policies of the
Franco regime. It is worth noting that in spite of receivinga large influx of foreign capital since its
accession to the European Union (1986), the ‘quality’ of capital did not rise in Spain above the
historical trend rate over 1986-2000, suggesting a weak and delayed impact of ICT technologies.36
[FIGURE 3]
[FIGURE 4]
c) Land input
The usual practice in historical research is to include land as an independent factor of
production.37 However, in most growth accounting exercises land is considered together with the
35 Alas, our historical exercise fails to capture all the composition -or ‘quality’- changes, as we cannot carry
out a deeper de-aggregation by type of asset, but hints the direction in which composition changes take place.
Our attempt represents a step ahead with regards to the conventional estimates that do not adjust for the
service provided by each type of asset but simply rely on the stock of capital –in which one dollar of
dwellings amounts to the same as a dollar in machinery in terms of the service provided to production.
36 See Mas and Quesada, “ICT and Economic Growth”; and Timmer and van Ark, “Information and
Communication Technology”.
37 See, for example, Crafts, British Economic Growth; Antrás and Voth, “Factor Prices”. Bosworth and
Collins, “China and India”, also include land as an independent factor for present-day developing countries.
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capital stock due to the difficulty to ascertain the actual amount of land in use.38 Moreover, to
establish the price of unimproved land, which is the relevant one, represents a major obstacle as its
market price includes improvements to land, that actually correspond to capital input. We have
opted here for providing estimates of the sources of growth in which land is considered as a
separate factor of production.39
Alas since we found impossible to distinguish the part that corresponded to capital
incorporated into the improved land, we settled for a crude estimate of the land stock. The first step
was to elaborate yearly land figures. Unfortunately, estimates for total agricultural land only exist at
some benchmarks before the late 1950s40 that we have interpolated to derive annual figures and,
then, adjusted for the economic cycle with the deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott trend in
agricultural output.41 Next, we converted hectares of land into a stock by weighting each type of
land by its price at two different benchmark years (1931 and 1985) and, then, spliced the resulting
38 Cf. Matthews et al. British Economic Growth, p. 205, and A. Maddison, “Growth and Slowdown”, p. 660.
In Spain, San Juan, Eficacia y rentabilidad, does not distinguish between land and capital and includes land
in the capital stock.
39 In the Appendix we provide growth accounting estimates in which land is considered as part of capital.
40 The benchmarks correspond to the following years, 1834, 1860, 1891/95, 1897/1901, 1909/13, 1920/22,
1929/33, 1950, and 1958. The sources from which our estimates have been constructed are Garrabou and
Sanz, Historia Agraria, for 1834 and 1860; Simpson, Spanish Agriculture, for 1891/95-1929/33; Banco
Urquijo, La riqueza, for 1920; and O’Brien and Prados de la Escosura, ”Agricultural Productivity”,
background computations, for 1891-1980; Hayami and Ruttan, Agricultural Development and Prasada Rao
Inter-Country Comparisons provide international comparable aggregate land estimates for 1960 and at five
year benchmarks for 1970-90, respectively. Fortunately for main crops (major cereals, roots, fruit trees, vine
and olive) annual figures are available (Barciela et al., “Sector agrario”).
41 Agricultural output from Prados de la Escosura, Progreso.
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quantity indices into a single Laspeyres index for the entire period considered.42 Since the land
stock grew little over the long run (Table 3 and Figure 5), and certainly much less than capital and
labor, its inclusion in the growth accounting exercise pushes TFP growth upwards.43
[TABLE 3]
[FIGURE 5]
d) Labor input
The appropriate measure of labor input is the flow of services for production emanating from
this factor.44 Hence, our task is to estimate the labor force cross-classified by as many attributes as
possible to capture its heterogeneity.45 Unfortunately, in the case of Spain, census and survey data
for distant periods contain limited information and we can only offer a simplified version of labor
input accounts. Thus, we have employed two different procedures. For 1850-1954, Spanish
working population has been cross-classified by gender, two different age attributes (adult, child),
branch of activity, income, and hours of work but we have been unable to match the income
42 Indices with fixed weights (land prices) for 1931 and 1985 were respectively constructed for 1850-1958
and 1958-2000 and, then, spliced into a single quantity index of the stock of agricultural land. Land prices
for 1931 and 1985 come from Bringas, Productividad de los Factores and Ministerio de Agricultura,
Estadística Agroalimentaria, respectively. There are minor differences between the stock estimates
(Laspeyres index) and the number of hectares index at least until the 1960s, which suggests that only minor
composition changes took place over the first hundred years considered.
43 Contrary to Matthews et al.’s (British Economic Growth:, p. 206) suggestion, adding land reduces factor
input growth and, hence, increases that of TFP.
44 It is usually assumed that such a flow is proportional to the hours of work involved. That is,
(12) Lit = λLiHit,
Where L is labor input,λLi is a constant, and H is the measured work hours.
45 Ideally, one should estimate the working population classified by gender, age, education, sector of
economic activity, income (wages), hours of work, and type of worker (i.e., employee, self-employed, and so
on).
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received by each worker with her/his age and level of education. However, as a sensitivity test, we
provide below alternative estimates for the labor input on the basis of educational attainment data.
The first step in the construction of labor input series was to elaborate yearly employment
figures for the four main sectors (agriculture, forestry, and fishing, industryconstruction, and services)
on the basis of population censuses. Major shortcomings are posed by Spanish census data: working
population is only available at benchmark years and refers to the economically active population
[EAP, thereafter], with no regard of involuntary unemployment, while female EAP in agriculture is
inconsistent over time. Therefore, we had been forced to make some tough choices. For example, in
order to derive consistent figures over time for EAP in agriculture, we excluded the census figures
for female population,46 while assumed that female labor represented a stable proportion of male
labor force in agriculture and, thus, we have increased the number of days assigned to each male
worker (see below).47 Moreover, as the share of EAP in agriculture is suspiciously stable over 1797-
1910, in spite of increasing industrialization and urbanization, we adjusted it by assuming that the
share of EAP in agriculture moved along the proportion of rural population (living in villages with
less than 5,000 inhabitants) in total population.48 The next step was to obtain yearly EAP figures
through log-linear interpolation of benchmark observations. Employment figures for each major
sector of economic activity were, then, derived by adjusting yearly EAP series for the economic
46 Female labor was not included in agricultural EAP in the 1797 and 1860 population censuses and
represented a small and declining proportion of male labor, thereafter. Thus, female/male ratios in
agricultural EAP were, according to population censuses around 0.2 over 1877-1900 and ranged between
0.05 and 0.1 during the early 20 th century. The exclusion of females working in agriculture from the total
working population is usual in Spanish historical literature. Cf. Nicolau, “Población”; Erdozáin and
Mikelarena, “Cifras de activos agrarios”; and Pérez Moreda “Población y economía”, p. 55.
47 A similar strategy was followed by Carré et al., French Economic Growth, p. 89.
48 We follow here Prados de la Escosura, Progreso, pp. 207-8, and adjusted downwards the percentage of
EAP employed in agriculture between 1887 and 1920 redistributing the ‘excess’ agricultural workers
proportionally between industry and services.
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cycle (obtained as deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott trend in output). Later, employment figures
by sector were corrected to preserve additive congruence with the cycle-adjusted figures for total
employment.
Employment in these four large sectors was, then, distributed into their branches. Up to 1955
population censuses allowed us to cross classify working population into 19 industries up to 1900,
21 industries for 1900-10, 22 for 1911-50, and 24, thereafter.49 Alas, lack of data for 1850-1900
forced us to breakdown manufacturing employment into its branches by assuming that its
distribution in 1900 was representative for the entire period.50
Second, the data on employment (number of workers) was converted into days and, then,
hours worked per year, for the period 1850-1954. We assumed that each full-time worker was
employed 270 days per annum in industry and services. Such figure results from deducting Sundays
and religious holidays plus an allowance for illness.51 This assumption is consistent with
contemporary testimonies and supported by the available evidence.52 In agriculture, however,
49 Population censuses are available in Spain for 1860, 1877, 1887, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, and 1950.
50 Unfortunately we cannot carry out a sensitivity test for the consequences of such an arbitrary assumption.
However, since agriculture and services provided most of the employment prior to 1900 (above 80 percent)
the bias introduced by our assumption should not be very large. The fact that the number of hours worked
across manufacturing industries did not change significantly during the late 19th century also works to
reduce the size of the bias. Employment data on mining and construction is drawn from Chastagnaret
L’Espagne and Prados de la Escosura Progreso, respectively.
51 Interestingly enough a similar number of days is obtained for the 1960s and early 1970s. For example, for
1973, the Conference Board, on the basis of OECD data, estimated 2,005 hours worked per person in Spain,
while ILO reckoned that, on average, Spanish workers spent 44.2 hours per week at their place of work. This
means that, on average, Spaniards worked 272 days per year.
52 Soto Carmona (Trabajo industrial, p. 608) pointed out that, on average, the number of days worked per
occupied up to 1919 ranged between 240 and 270.
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contemporary and historians’ estimates point to a lower figure for the working days per occupied.53
Throughout most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, full employment among peasants
only occurred during the summer period and, consequently, workers were idle for up to four months
every year.54 Moreover, as the opportunity cost of allocating agricultural labor to alternative
occupations during the slack season was minimal, peasants carried out additional non-agricultural
activities, such as producing their own implements, clothing and, especially, providing services
such as transportation and storing.55 However, Spanish population censuses tend to include only
information about people’s main occupation, and given ‘pluriactivity’ in agricultural EAP, non-
agricultural occupations performed by peasants tend to be underestimated. At the same time, the
inconsistency of population census numbers for female labor in agriculture led us to exclude these
figures (see above) but, at the same time, required an allowance for female EAP in agricultural
53 Day laborers, according to García Sanz, “Jornales agrícolas”, p. 63, worked an average of 242 days per
year in mid-nineteenth century Spain. Gómez Mendoza, Ferrocarriles, p. 101, emphasized the seasonal
nature of late nineteenth century employment and estimated that, on average, a farm labore r worked 210
days out of 275-300 working days per year. Vandellós, “Richesse et Revenue”, reckoned that, in 1914, the
average number of days worked per year in agriculture was 250 . Simpson, “Technical change”, estimated
labor requirements in Andalusia’s agriculture between 1886 and 1930 and obtained even lower figures,
ranging from 108 to 130 days.
54 Using Simpson’s, “Technical change”, labor requirements per hectare for each type of crop, we have
computed, under the astringent assumption of constant technology, the number of full days of work required
by Spanish agriculture at different agricultural benchmarks (1891/95, 1897/1901, 1909/13, 1920, 1929/33,
1950, and 1958) and divided the resulting figures by the male EAP in agriculture. They range from 129
(1891/95) to 178 days (1929/33) per male worker. Simpson considers his estimates to be on the low side. In
fact, even if we arbitrarily raise them by 25 percent, the number of days worked would range from 172
(1891/95) to 238 days (1929/33).
55 Pérez Moreda, “Población y economía”, p. 57, mentions a contemporary estimate for 1960 that puts
disguised unemployment at 1.8 million in a potential agricultural workforce of over 5 million.
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activities. Thus, we assumed that female labor represented a stable proportion of male labor force in
this sector and, hence, the number of days assigned to each male worker was raised to 270 days per
year per occupied in the countryside, distributed between agriculture (240 days) and services (30
days).
As regards the numbers of yearly hours worked per occupied we observed that there was not
only a long-run decline over 1850-1954, but also a large variance across sectors. For mid-nineteenth
century agriculture, Fermín Caballero pointed to 10 hours per day while a similar average figure,
9.7 hours, was found for the mid 1950s.56 We decided to accept 10 hours per day for 1850-1911 and
to interpolate these two figures exponentially over 1912-35, while we maintained 9.7 hours for the
period 1936-54. For industry and services, Michael Huberman’s figures for 1870-1899 were
accepted and exponentially interpolated to derive annual hours worked, while the number of hours
worked in 1870 was accepted for 1850-69.57 Jordi Domenech’s estimates for different industries
and services in 1910 were adopted for 1900-1910, while Javier Silvestre’s annual computations for
industry were used over 1911-1919.58 Álvaro Soto Carmona provides some construction and
services figures for the Interwar years.59 The next period for which we had quantitative evidence on
hours worked was the early 1950s. We found that the number of hours per worker was often close
to that of 1919, a far from surprising fact as qualitative evidence suggests that the number of hours
per worker probably declined during the 1920s and early 1930s in a context of trade unions’ rising
bargaining power, but remained unchanged or even grew during the early General Franco’s
Dictatorship. So we chose to accept the number of working hours per occupied in 1954 for the years
1936-53, and to interpolate exponentially the figures for 1919 and 1936.
56 Caballero, Memoria. The figure for the 1950s was obtained dividing yearly hours, which was provided by
Teresa Sanchis (private communication), by the amount of yearly working days.
57 Huberman, “Working Hours”.
58 Doménech, “Working Hours”; Silvestre, Migraciones interiors, p. 190.
59 Soto Carmona, Trabajo industrial, pp. 596-613.
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For the post-1954 period, labor force data comes from the MOISSES base for the period
1954-1963,60 from Encuesta de Población Activa (thereafter EPA) for 1964-1980,61 and from the
official national accounts for 1980-2000.62 The distribution of overall labor force across the
different industries was based on Banco de Bilbao’s studies.63 We, then, distributed workers for
each industry into four occupational categories (unskilled and skilled operatives, technicians, and
managers) with information provided by Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). Finally, we
converted the amount of workers into hours worked for each occupation and branch of economic
activity by assuming that, in a given sector, all employees worked the same amount of hours per
year.64
The amount of labor, measured by total hours worked, presents a moderate increase over the
long run. Labor force grew moderately up to World War I while accelerated during the 1920s and
early 1930s partly as a result of population growth and rural-urban migration. Labor quantity rose
again during the Golden Age (1951-74). The ‘transition to democracy’ decade (1975-86) witnessed
a dramatic employment destruction driven by the oil shocks and the exposition of traditionally
sheltered industrial sectors to international competition. Labor market deregulation, a marked
increase in female participation rate, and the arrival of immigrants -only in the last decade of the
twentieth century-, are beneath the rise in employment since 1987.
60 Antonio Díaz Ballesteros kindly provided us with this data.
61 Reconstructed in Baiges et al., Economía española.
62 The different time segments were spliced using the “gap” distribution procedure for those years in which
the different estimates overlap, as employed in Prados de la Escosura, Progreso. Official national accounts,
CNE80, CNE85, CNE95, and CNE2000 have been used for 1980-85, 1985-95 and 1995-2000, respectively.
63 These are collected in Fundación BBV, Renta nacional.
64 Sanchis (private communication), furnished us with data on hours per economically active population for
the 1950s. We used Maluquer de Motes and Llonch, “Trabajo y relaciones laborales”, who rely on ILO data,
for 1958-63; Ministerio de Trabajo’s Salarios for 1964-78; and OECD, Labor Force Statistics from 1979
onwards.
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[TABLE 4]
A closer look at the evolution of the labor quantity can be obtained by breaking down the
amount of hours worked into its components using the identity in which total hours worked, (H),
equals hours per employee, (H/E), times the rate of employment, that is, the employee, E, to EAP,
L, ratio (E/L), times the participation rate (that is, the ratio of EAP, L, to the population in working
age, that is, 15 to 64 years old, WAN), (L/WAN), times the share of working age population in total
population, (WAN/N), times total population (N):
(13) H = (H/E) * (E/L)* (L/WAN) * (WAN/N)* N
That in rates of change (lower case letters), can be expressed as:
(14) h = (h/e) + (e/l) + (l/wan) + (wan/n) + n
Population growth and the decline in working hours per employee explain, in a proportion of
two-to-one, most of the moderate increase in the labor quantity over the long run (Table 4). Hours
per worker and per year shrank from 2,800 at mid-nineteenth century to 1,800 by the end of the
twentieth century (Figure 6).65
[FIGURE 6]
Throughout the hundred and fifty years of modern economic growth considered here, the
rise of the quantity of labor measure in the total amount of hours worked was mainly determined by
population growth. However, a closer look reveals how other factors at work conditioned its
evolution across different long swings. For example, the declining hours per worker/year over
1914-36, a result of the gradual adoption of the eight hours per day standard associated to
increasing urbanization and structural change. In the 1920s, falling hours per worker went hand-in-
65 The decline in the number of daily hours worked per occupied led Denison, Sources, to introduce the
caveat that the effort per hour was inversely related to the number of hours worked. This reasoning leads to
make employment rather than hours worked the relevant indicator of the quantity of labor in growth
accounting (Gordon, “U.S. Economic Growth”, p. 124). However, here we follow the conventional approach
and use total hours worked as a measure of the labor quantity.
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hand with a significant increase in the employment rate, also linked to structural transformation.
Between the early 1930s and 1950s, the rising share of the working age population, a gift from the
demographic transition, made up for the contraction in participation (L/WAN) and employment
(E/L) rates. In the Golden Age, the participation rate fell short of offsetting the rise in the
dependency rate and the significant fall in annual hours worked per employed person, with the
consequence of a deceleration in the growth of the total hours worked. Later, during the ‘transition
to democracy’ years (1975-86), the fall in the participation rate, the dramatic surge in
unemployment, and the intensified decline in yearly hours per occupied, that resulted from
employment restructuring and the trade unions’ increased bargaining power provoked a dramatic
contraction in the quantity of labor. Since Spain’s entry into the European Union (1986), the brisk
recovery in the participation and employment rates help explain the increase in the total hours
worked.
The third phase in the construction of the labor input is to weight each categoryof workers by
its average nominal earnings.66 The quality and availability of wage data necessary to construct these
estimates vary enormously through time and, due to data availability, four periods have been
considered, 1850-1908, 1908-1920, 1920-1954, and 1954-2000. We have drawn on a wide variety of
sources to obtain wage data for 1850-1908.67 From 1908 to 1920, we employed in our calculations
66 In the case of self-employed workers, we have assumed, following the principle of opportunity cost, that
their labor cost was equal to those of the average worker in their industry (Cf. Prados de la Escosura and
Rosés, “Wages”).
67 Agricultural wages were taken from Bringas, Productividad de los factores. Wages in construction
(Madrid unskilled wages) and services were obtained from Reher and Ballesteros, “Precios y salarios”,
although they have been re-scaled to the national levels provided by Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso, “Regional
Wage Convergence”. Chastagneret, L’Espagne, and Escudero, Minería, provided wages for mining. Levels
of manufacturing wages in all industry and services sectors at different dates (1850, 1880, 1905) were
obtained, respectively, from Cerdá, Teoría General, U.S. Department of Labor, Fifteenth Annual Report, and
Anuario Estadístico de Barcelona. Annual variations between benchmarks were derived by means of Fisher
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the detailed wage enquires conducted by the Instituto de Reformas Sociales.68 Their reports
(Memorias Generales de la Inspección de Trabajo) contained information by gender on minimum,
maximum and average wages for twenty branches of industry.69 The quality of wage data decreases
dramatically over the years 1920-1954.70 In 1920, Instituto de Reformas Sociales disappeared, being
replaced by the Ministerio de Trabajo, and such a change implied that wage data collection was
interrupted. Subsequently, wages for only nine occupations and fifty Spanish provinces were
published in the Anuario Estadístico de España (hereafter AEE) that was extended up to fifteen
occupations by 1925. Nonetheless, a detailed survey on industry wages for 1914, 1920, 1925 and
1930 was published in 1931.71 By combining the wage levels from the Ministerio de Trabajo’s
survey for 1930 and wage variation rates from AEE, we constructed our nominal wage series,
classified by industry, for the period 1920-1936. Difficulties to obtain wage data increased since the
Civil War. During the early years of General Franco’s Dictatorship –the so called Autarchy period-,
wages and earnings were severely regulated and included in-kind and extra-payments not comprised
in the wage data from earlier publications. Moreover, the only published information was collected
at AEE.72 We, then, spliced wage levels for 1930 and 1955 with a Fisher index of wage yearly
variations constructed from the AEE data to obtain yearly wage series. From 1954 onwards, we
indices with data drawn from Camps, Formación del Mercado de trabajo; Llonch, “Jornada, salarios”; and
Soler, “Evolución del salario”, in the case of consumer industries, and Escudero, Minería; and Pérez
Castroviejo, Clase obrera, in the remaining industries.
68 Javier Silvestre has kindly given us access to his wages database.
69 Unfortunately, the source does not provide information on wages in agriculture and services so we had to
rely on data from Bringas, Productividad de los factores; and Reher and Ballesteros, “Precios y salarios”,
respectively.
70 Vilar, “Ruptura posbélica” for a review on the wage sources for this period.
71 Ministerio de Trabajo, Estadística de salarios.
72 Recently, Vilar “Ruptura posbélica” collected new data from unpublished local sources that we have
employed in our calculations.
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employed labor costs by sectors of economic activity from Banco de Bilbao.73 These do not
provide, however, a breakdown by occupational categories that had to be obtained, then, from the
official enquiries on wage, labor costs, and wage structure,74 and which were later re-scaled to
match aggregate figures in Banco de Bilbao’s statistics.
[FIGURE 7]
Figure 7 reports the evolution of labor input and labor quantity (unweighted hours worked)
from 1850 to 2000. Although the evolution of labor input parallels that of labor quantity, a faster
growth is observed in the labor input resulting from shifts in labor composition (“quality”) -derived
as the ratio between the labor input and the labor quantity- that, in so far it captures improvements
in workers’ skills, provides a measure of human capital. Three acceleration phases stand out in the
evolution of the labor input: the 1920s, the Golden Age, and 1986-2000 (Table 5, Col. III). Labor
quality improvements contributed significantly to labor input growth in the Interwar and the Golden
Age, while represented an offsetting force when labor destruction took place during the ‘transition
to democracy’ years (1975-86) (Table 5, Col. II). Interestingly, labor quality hardly seems to have
made a contribution to the growth of labor input following Spain’s accession to the European Union
in 1986 (Figure 8).
[TABLE 5]
[FIGURE 8]
This counterintuitive result for the post-1986 period raises the question of whether our labor
input measure using the Jorgenson approach actually captures improvements in human capital
affecting the labor force. Since human capital is usually approximated through education
measures,75 we made alternative estimates of the quality of labor on the basis of educational
attainment for a sensitivity test. Thus, we computed a human capital measure using data on age
73 Collected in Fundación BBV, Renta nacional; and Alcaide and Alcaide, Renta nacional.
74 Salarios, Encuesta de Salarios y de Coste Laboral and Encuesta de Estructura Salarial.
75 For Spain, see Mas et al., Capital Humano; and Doménech and de la Fuente, “Human Capital”.
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structure (as a measure of experience) and years of education attained, calibrated with the
parameters from a Mincer equation for Spain in the early 1990s (Table 5, Col. IV).76. The average
age of Spanish population ages 15 to 64 comes from data supplied by David Reher and are assumed
representative for the labor force.77 Education attainment is based on Núñez estimates of the years
of schooling received for population ages 15 to 50 for the period 1897-1974, projected backwards to
1877 with Núñez’s own estimates for years of education of population ages 15-40 (1887-97) and
15-30 (1877-87), and, again, to 1850 with years of primary education acquired at the age of 15.78
For the post-1974 period, we have relied on Daniel Cohen and Marcelo Soto’s benchmark estimates
of years of education interpolated log-linearly to obtain a yearly series and spliced with Nuñez’s
figures.79 We carried out additional estimates and, following Bosworth and Collins, we obtained
alternative human capital measures by relating educational attainment (EDU) to average years of
schooling (s). Thus, EDU = (1+r)s, with r being the rate of return.80 We assumed alternatively 9 and
7.2 percent rates of return to each year.81 The results of these alternative estimates, presented in
Table A-2 of the Appendix, are highly coincidental.
76 Arrazola et al., “Returns to Education”, p. 297. The estimate was carried out with data for 1993/4.
77 We gratefully acknowledge David Reher who provided us with his unpublished yearly estimates of age
composition of Spanish population between 1858 and 1970. We used INI official figures from 1970
onwards, and assumed that 1858 age composition was representative of that of 1850-57.
78 Núñez, “Educación”, pp. 167, 239-40 (Tables 3.1 and 3.13).
79 Cohen and Soto, “Growth and Human Capital”. The data used refer to “years of schooling of population
15-64 who is not studying”. It is worth noting the high coincidence between figures by Núñez and Cohen and
Soto during the years in which their estimates overlap (1960-74).
80 Bosworth and Collins, “Empirics of Growth”, pp. 119-20.
81 The 9 percent return has been obtained by Alba and San Segundo, “Returns to Education”, p. 162, after
controlling for self-selection. The 7.2 percent return is quoted in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, “Returns to
Investment in Education”: 127, and derives from Mora, Socioeconomic Background.
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If we now compare our labor quality estimates obtained through the Jorgenson and the
Mincer approaches (Table 5, Cols. II and IV, respectively) their results largely concur, except for
the 1920s, when educational attainment figures show no improvement, and the 1987-2000 period,
when the labor quality obtained through the Mincer approach shows a gain of 0.9 percent growth,
against the 0.2 percent obtained with the Jorgenson approach. In the case of the 1920s, our view is
that the Jorgenson labor quality estimates seem to be more consistent with the evidence on growth
and structural change than those suggesting negligible growth derived from the educational
attainment approach.
We have made an attempt to solve the conundrum for the post-1986 period by carrying out a
sensitivity test for the period 1964-2000, when better data are available. Thus, we have computed a
new labor quality index in which the occupational categories of our Jorgenson index were replaced
by educational categories and workers and, then, weighted by the average remuneration of their
education level in their respective industries. Thus, we, firstly, we substituted five educational
categories (illiterate, primary schooling, secondary schooling, previous to tertiary, tertiary) from
Mas et al. study on human capital for our occupational categories.82 Then, we employed the
parameters from Alfonso Alba and María-Jesús San Segundo’s Mincerian regression83 for 1990 to
weight each category by its relative value (wage) while maintaining the congruence with the total
remuneration of the industry. Hence, the relative remuneration of different educational categories is
identical within all industries but average wages differed across industries. The new Mincerian
labor quality estimates cast annual growth rates of 1.0 and 0.8 percent for 1975-86 and 1987-2000,
respectively. These results match quite well those previously derived with the educational
attainment approach to human capital confirming the discrepancy regarding labor quality growth
over 1987-2000 between our direct Jorgenson-type estimate and that derived from the Mincerian
82 Mas et al. Capital Humano
83 Alba and San Segundo, “Returns to Education”, p. 159. These parameters represent the average
educational premium for each educational category.
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approach. It could be that such a discrepancy resulted from internal changes in the composition of
labor categories, as the amount of education per type of worker increased dramatically from 1986 to
2000 with the diffusion of compulsory schooling, secondary and tertiary education. We can, then,
conclude that our Jorgenson labor input measure is biased against human capital since 1986 but
captures reasonably well the impact of human capital on labor quality over the long-run. Actually,
over the period 1964-2000, the Jorgenson and the new Mincer estimates cast similar growth rates
(0.8 and 0.9 percent, respectively). Therefore, we will take both estimates into account in our
analysis of the sources of growth in Spain.
e) Factor shares
In addition to the real factor inputs described above, we need to know the elasticity of output
with respect to each input (Θi) in order to compute the sources of growth. Under the restrictive
assumption of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, these elasticities can be proxied by the
share of each factor’s returns in national income. Such an assumption might be objectionable as
restrictions on competition and monopolistic practices are common in Spanish history.84 If the
existence of competitive monopolistic rents were proved, our ‘naïve’ results, obtained under the
assumption of perfect competition, would bias total factor productivity growth downwards, as the
capital share in GDP –by including competitive monopolyprofits- would overstate the elasticity of
output with respect to capital, and the result would be a lower bound estimate for TFP growth.85
84 Cf. Fraile Balbín, Industrialización and Retórica.
85 Young, “Tyranny of Numbers”, p. 648. Relaxing the assumption of constant returns to scale would also
impinge on our TFP estimates. If Spanish aggregate production function featured increasing returns to scale,
our ‘residual’ would over-exaggerate TFP growth (Young, “Tyranny of Numbers”, p. 648). Nonetheless,
Suárez, “Economías de escala” rejected the increasing returns hypothesis for the case of Spain between 1965
and 1990.
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Nonetheless, even if this were the case, as we can see below, the main stylized facts resulting would
not be significantly altered.
Up to 1954, labor returns were directly estimated. From 1954 onwards, we derived factor
shares from labor and propertycompensation provided by the different sets of national accounts that
we have previously spliced together.86 To measure labor income correctly it is crucial to establish
which proportion of the income of proprietors, unpaid family workers, self-employed, and retired
workers represent returns to labor.87 We have attributed to entrepreneurs and self-employed workers
a labor income per head equal to the average compensation of employees in their corresponding
industry.88 Dividing total labor (including self-employed) compensation by GDP at factor costs, we
obtained the share of labor. The well-known difficulties to separate land rent from returns to capital in
agriculture suggested us to include land rent in the returns of property, together with those of capital.89
Nonetheless, we have made an attempt to decompose the share of property in national income into the
returns to capital and land. The lack of information on land rents forced us to derive the land share as
the residual after deducting labor outlays from agricultural gross value added. This method implies no
86 We followed the same procedure employed for linking GDP and its components, and labor force in Prados
de la Escosura (Progreso: chapter 4), in which instead of just simply re-scaling earlier national accounts by
their differential ratio for the overlapping year, an alternative linkage procedure was used in which the gap
was distributed over time at a constant annual rate.
87 See Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Wages”.
88 Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth. This is a common procedure in growth accounting (Jorgenson,
“Productivity”).
89 The returns to land remunerate its original productive capability that results from natural factors. In
practice, however, it is practically impossible to quantify the ‘original’ productive capability of any kind of
land since other factors (cap ital, in particular) are involved in it. (Ministerio de Agricultura, Cuentas del
sector agrario, pp. 46-50). In his major work on the efficiency of Spanish agriculture since 1964, San Juan,
Eficacia y rentabilidad, does only consider labor and capital (that includes land) as production factors in the
estimate of the sources of agricultural growth.
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returns to capital from agriculture and, hence, tends to overstate the share of land in GDP.90 The share
of capital was obtained as a residual after deducting labor and land returns from GDP at factor cost.91
[TABLE6]
[FIGURE 9]
Figure 9 shows the evolution of the shares of land, capital and labor in GDP. On average, for
the one and a half centuries considered, our factor shares are 0.08 for land, 0.24 for capital –that is,
0.32 for property-, and 0.68 for labor, that roughly match the 1/3 and 2/3 weights conventionally
employed in the growth literature. Average shares vary across long swings with labor fluctuating
around two-thirds of GDP, except in the phase of accelerating growth, 1959-74, and during the
critical years of the ‘transition to democracy’ (1975-86) in which it reached above three-fourths of
GDP (Table 6). Interestingly the peak of labor share corresponds to years in which skilled workers
represented a larger proportion of the labor force and income inequality was lower.92
The relative instability of productive factors’ shares in GDP stands out against the
conventional assumption of stability. This is largely a consequence of data limitations, but their
fluctuations can be explained.93 In Spain, the functional distribution of income appears to be a good
90 Nonetheless, given that the relative size of agriculture shrank during the second half of the twentieth
century, the resulting (upwards) bias in our TFP growth estimates should not be large.
91 Although we will estimate the sources of growth using three independent factors of production land,
capital, and labor, we will also replicate the exercise using only capital and labor (See Appendix, Table A-3).
92 Prados de la Escosura, “Inequality, Poverty”. A rise in income inequality took place in the late 1990s
partly resulting from an improvement in the returns to property income (Alvaredo and Saez, Income and
Wealth).
93 It could be argue that the common assumption of fixed factor shares in the literature makes virtue out of
necessity. See Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth”, pp. 154-5, and Bosworth and Collins, “Empirics
of Growth”, p. 115. Maddison, “Growth and Slowdown”, pp. 659-61, provides an interesting discussion in
which he argues in favor of fixed factor shares and suggests 0.3 for capital and 0.7 for labor. See the
discussion of the relevant literature in Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Wages”.
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proxy for income distribution up to 1960, as the dispersion within labor and property compensation
was relatively unaltered.94 Only later, as skilled labor increased, did the functional distribution
become non-representative of personal income distribution. Distinct phases can be observed.
Between mid-nineteenth century and World War I a relative increase in the property share occurred
while the labor share tended to decrease. The growing importance of capital can be attributed,
among other causes, to rising investment rates and technological change favoring capital.95 The rise
in inequality (from the late 1890s to the end of World War I) coincided with a return to strict
protectionism. Stolper-Samuelson forces would have been reinforced by the fact that tariff
protection did not push out workers as the depreciation of the peseta increased the cost of
migration.96 In the interwar years, the labor share grew significantly. Institutional labor market
reforms favoring workers, especially the reduction in the number of working hours per day, and the
increasing voice of trade unions, contributed to a rise in wages relative to property incomes. Also
the increase in the human capital endowment of the workforce influenced the expansion of labor.97
The early years of the Franco’s regime witnessed a sharp decrease in the labor share, an outcome of
dictatorship’s economic policy that implied a re-distribution of income towards property owners.98
Since the mid-1950s a rapid increase in labor share took place that peaked by the late 1960s when
94 See Prados de la Escosura, “Inequality, Poverty”, on which this paragraph draws on.
95 It is worth considering the evolution of the land share. After the 1855 peak, usually associated to the
Crimean War boom, the land share fell until 1866. From the late 1860s to the mid-1880s, the land share
recovered as agricultural exports expanded and the economy grew rapidly. The so called ‘agricultural
depression’ appears to have had an impact on returns to land in the late eighties with a trough in 1892, just at
the time Cánovas protectionist tariff was introduced.
96 Sánchez-Alonso, “European Migration”
97 As regards land rents, its recovery peaked during First World War to decline in its aftermath, and more
severely in the years of the Great Depression and the Civil War.
98 The autarchy years in early Franco’s Regime witnessed a recovery of land rents that was reverted since the
early 1950s once Spain started a sustained process of accelerated growth.
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pre-Civil War levels were recovered. These labor share gains can be attributed to an expansion of
human capital and to the more liberal economic policies that accompanied growth and structural
change in the late Francoist regime. Since the early 1970s, however, the capital share in GDP has
tended to grow at expenses of labor.
The crudeness of annual factor shares has often led authors to prefer the use of fixed factor
shares over time, so we present here growth accounts derived with variable factor shares and, as a
sensitivity test, also with fixed factor shares that correspond to their average over the hundred and
fifty years considered.
MAIN TRENDS IN TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
The sources of long-run growth in Spain are offered in Table 7, with labor quality estimates
using the Jorgenson approach and the resulting TFP estimates in Cols. (VI) and (VII), and
alternative estimates using the Mincer approach and the subsequent TFP estimates in Cols. (VIII)
and (IX). Estimates derived with variable factor shares are presented in the upper panel and those
with fixed factor shares (namely, their average for 1850-2000) in the lower panel. Over the one-
and-a-half century considered, TFP and broad capital (physical and, to less extent, human capital)
appear to be equally responsible for GDP growth. A glance at long periods shows that the early
1950s represent a divide between hundred years of moderate growth dominated by factor
accumulation, and half a century of fast growth led by total factor productivity. Actually, 70 percent
of the acceleration in GDP growth over 1951-2000 compared with 1850-1950, is due to efficiency
gains.
[TABLE7]
A closer look at long swing intervals reveals that prior to 1950 total factor productivity
played a far from negligible role in phases of faster GDP growth: 1850-83 and the 1920s. Thus,
TFP contributed between one-third and one-half (depending on whether Jorgenson or Mincer labor
quality estimates are chosen) to acceleration of GDP growth in the 1920s over 1884-1920.
Furthermore, the importance of TFP as a source of growth tends to be underestimated as it does not
31
include the additional capital accumulation that results from a productivity increase.99 Thus, in the
absence of the innovation represented by the introduction of the railroads and the modern
exploitation of Spanish mining ore deposits during 1850-83 and by electrification in the 1920s, we
could speculate that the Spanish economy would have experienced not only lower efficiency gains
but also lower capital intensity resulting from the lack of new capital goods.100
Total factor productivity led GDP growth during 1953-1986, a period that included both the
Golden Age and, unexpectedly, the decade of sluggish growth when the transition from dictatorship
to democracy was undertaken. TFP contributed with more than half of GDP growth during the
Golden Age, and two-thirds to its acceleration over the previous hundred years. In fact, about two-
thirds and four-fifths of the acceleration in GDP growth in 1953-58 and 1959-74 over the previous
long swings (1930-52 and 1953-58, respectively) were due to TFP. Then, in the ‘transition to
democracy’ years (1975-86) efficiency gains prevented a GDP contraction, as the increase in broad
capital fell short to compensate the dramatic decline in employment. Conversely, since Spain’s
entry into the European Union (1986) employment creation and the recovery of physical capital
accumulation offset the slowdown in total factor productivity.101 The alternative use of variable and
fixed factor shares across long swings does not cast conflicting results.102
99 Cf. Hulten and Srinivasan, “Indian Manufacturing”.
100 Cf. Crafts, “Productivity Growth”, pp. 522-4. As regards the impact of railroads on Spain’s growth, see
Herranz-Loncán, “Railroad Impact”. This author (p. 873) estimates the railroad TFP contribution to GDP
growth (through a social saving approach) in 0.045 percent. This would represent between 7 and 12 percent
of Spain’s TFP growth over 1850-1883 (using variable and fixed factor shares, respectively) that would rise
to 9-20 percent with Mincer labor quality estimates. This back-of-the-envelope exercise suggests a far from
negligible contribution of the railroad to aggregate TFP growth. On electrification in 1920s Spain Cf. Betrán,
Natural Resources, and Sanchis, “Economic ‘Miracle’”.
101 Spain is not the only case in Europe. For example, van Ark “European Union” claims that a slow
adjustment towards a new industrial structure is behind the productivity slowdown. In particular, he blames
the slow ICT diffusion in market services.
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If, alternatively, labor quality is measured through a Mincer approach (Table 7, Cols. (VIII)
and (IX)), noticeable differentials in the labor quality contribution only appear and have, therefore,
an impact on TFP growth in the 1920s and since 1987. During the 1920s, a lower improvement in
Mincer labor quality estimates increases TFP growth from the 1.1 percent obtained with the
Jorgenson approach (1.0 with fixed factor shares) to 1.6 percent, rising its contribution to GDP
growth from one-fourth to two-fifths, while, conversely, between 1987 and 2000, the more intense
labor quality gains in the Mincer estimates suppresses the TFP contribution to GDP growth (from
0.2 to -0.3 percent using variable factor shares, and from 0.6 to 0.1 percent with fixed factor
shares).103
How do our results compare to those obtained by empirical economists for the post-1964
era? A glance at Table 8 suggests that our growth rates are in line with those available for 1965-74
and for 1987-2000, in which a productivity slowdown has followed Spain’s admission into the
European Union, but are far higher for the ‘transition to democracy’ years (1975-86).104
[TABLE 9]
102 Only a minor discrepancy comes out for 1987-2000 due to the lower weight capital receives in this period
with fixed factor shares that results in higher TFP growth (0.6 versus 0.2 percent).
103 An alternative set of estimates in which land is not taken as a separate factor of production but included as
a part of capital, is provided in Table A-3 of the Appendix. The main difference with our previous estimates
that incorporate land as an independent factor is to cut down the rate of TFP growth, as land grows less than
capital. The exclusion of land as an independent factor of production provides, thus, a lower bound for TFP
growth. This is noticeable for 1850-83, the 1920s, and, especially, for 1953-58, with variable factor shares
(and for the second half of the twentieth century, with fixed factor shares). Thus, TFP growth is suppressed
for 1850-1950, as a whole using the Jorgenson approach to labor quality, while becomes negative for 1987-
2000 with the Mincer approach.
104 The reader should bear in mind that the methods employed in the computation of the sources of growth
differ widely across authors lending, perhaps, more validity to the coincidence of results during the years
1965-74 and 1987-2000.
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Modern economic growth is associated with improvements in GDP per head but, so far, the
discussion has been focused on absolute GDP trends. We need, therefore, to establish the
connection between increases in per capita GDP and efficiency gains. Table 9 provides an
intermediate stage, namely, the decomposition of output per head into hours per person and output
per hour. Although hours worked per person declined in the long run trend, the 1920s and the post-
1986 years show a marked increase in the labor quantity per head. Labor productivity, in turn, grew
at a modest pace before 1920 and, again, since Spain’s entry into the EU, while stagnated in the
thirties and forties, and experienced impressive gains between 1953 and 1986. Sluggish labor
productivity lies beneath weak improvements in GDP per head, with the exception of the last
quarter of the twentieth century when labor quantity and productivity evolve inversely.
Employment disappeared during the ‘transition to democracy’ years but was more than offset by the
productivity surge associated to industrial re-structuring and shifts of resources away from
agriculture and traditional industrial sectors. Since 1987 the productivity slowdown has been
compensated by a strong increase in hours worked. As Riccardo Faini put it for the Euro zone,
Spain seems to have been unable to combine employment and productivity growth since the mid-
1970s.105
[TABLE 10]
Labor productivity trends are determined, in turn, by human and physical capital/labor ratios
and efficiency gains. Table 10 provides the decomposition of labor productivity growth using
alternative sets of estimates (with variable and fixed factor shares in the upper and lower panels,
respectively) using Jorgenson (Cols. (IV)-(V)) and Mincer (Cols. (VI)-(VII)) labor quality
measures. A main finding is that TFP accounts for half the increase in labor productivity over the
one and a half centuries considered. Nonetheless, the divide between factor input accumulation as
the dominant force (contributing from two-thirds –Jorgenson- to three-fourths –Mincer- of labor
productivity growth) prior to 1950 and TFP as the hegemonic role of thereafter (with a contribution
105 Faini, “Europe”, p. 80.
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of two-third of labor productivity growth in the Golden Age and around one-half thereafter),
already observed for the sources of GDP growth, remains. If we look now at long swing intervals
we find that TFP largely contributed to the rise in output per hour in each of them but for the
Restauración (1884-1920), the 1930s and 1940s, and the post-1987 years. Furthermore, changes in
the pace at which labor productivity advanced are closely associated to those in TFP. For example,
TFP accounted for most, if not all, of labor productivity acceleration over the previous long swing
in the 1920s and, in the Golden Age, TFP made the largest contribution to the increase in output per
hour worked (about three-quarters). Even more important was its role in phases of labor
productivity decline when TFP accounts for nearly all of it.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main argumentsof the paper can now be re-stated. First, factor accumulation, especially
capital, and TFP growth seem to have been complementary for GDP and labor productivity growth
over the long-run 106 Spanish experience suggests a two-stage process in which improvingefficiency
appears as a complex learning process that takes place once growth has been initiatedon the basis of
allocating additional capital and labor to production. Abstention, rather than ingenuitydominated long-
run growth in Spain up to 1950. Thereafter, TFP growth, a ‘free lunch’ to use Joel Mokyr’s words,
drove economic progress and our results do not confirm Krugman’s intuition that growth on the basis
of capital accumulation leads to a growth slowdown in the future.107
106 New investment opportunities that increase capital accumulation as a result of technological change and
exogenous increases in investment that rise TFP growth as new capital vintages appear offer ways for their
interaction (Crafts, “Productivity Growth”, pp. 522-3). As Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth”, p.
164, point out, technical advances might be embodied in new capital while increasing TFP might induce
greater capital accumulation by raising the returns to capital.
107 Mokyr, Level of Riches, p. 3. According to Krugman, “Myth”, pp. 77-8, this happens as a result of the law
of diminishing returns The fact that TFP has slowed down since 1986 opens, nonetheless, this possibility in
the early twentieth-first century.
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Second, we accept that our growth accounting yields only a range of best guesstimates and that
our coverage of factor accumulation is far from perfect. However, it is important not to exaggerate the
skepticism. After computing the sources of growth with alternative measures of factor accumulation
and factor shares the resulting rates of TFP growth generallyexhibit fairly small differences.
Third, our results do not appear unusual in international perspective where there is growing
evidence suggesting that factor accumulation prevailed over efficiency gains in the early stages of
development. Factor accumulation seems to play a role during the transitional phase to long-run
growth.108 Once modern economic growth is under way, TFP tends to perform a more significant part.
Indeed, TFP provided at least one-quarter of British GDP growth between 1780 and 1860, a proportion
that increases to three-eights when embodied technological change is taken into account.109 Slow TFP
growth has also been confirmed for the nineteenth century in the United States.110 Long run
assessments for countries in the European Peripherysuch as Portugal and Turkey show similar
results.111 During the last four decades of the twentieth century developing countriesexhibited growth
rates dominated by factor accumulation.112 In modern Spain, as in Britain during the Industrial
Revolution, TFP accounted for most of labor productivity acceleration.113 Does the ability to absorb
and to adapt productively foreign ideas and technology depend on a country’s development level?114
Comparative historical research will be needed to widen our analysis of the sources of long-run growth
to countries at different levels of development before this hypothesis can be put to the test.
108 Grossman and Helpman, Innovation and Growth, p. 26.
109 Crafts, “Productivity Growth”, p. 533.
110 Kendrick, Productivity Trends; Abramovitz and David, “Two centuries”, p. 35.
111 Lains, “Catching Up”; Altug et al., “Sources”.
112 Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth”, p. 159. Young, “Tyranny of Numbers”, pp. 657-61; and
Young, “Razor’s Edge”.
113 Crafts, “Productivity Growth”.
114 Abramovitz, “Catching Up”; Collins and Bosworth, “Economic Growth”
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TABLE 1
GDP AND PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH, 1850-2000
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
(I) (II)
GDP Per Capita GDP
1850-2000 2.5 1.9
Panel A.
1850-1950 1.4 0.8
1951-1974 6.5 5.5
1975-2000 3.0 2.6
Panel B.
1850-1883 1.8 1.4
1884-1920 1.3 0.7
1921-1929 3.8 2.8
1930-1952 0.8 0.0
1953-1958 4.7 3.9
1959-1974 6.9 5.8
1975-1986 2.5 1.8
1987-2000 3.5 3.3
Sources: Prados de la Escosura, Progreso, and see text, fn. 1
TABLE 2
CAPITAL STOCK AND INPUT GROWTH, 1850-2000
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
(I) (II) (III)
Capital Capital Capital
Stock Input Quality
1850-2000 3.5 3.7 0.2
Panel A.
1850-1950 2.7 2.8 0.2
1951-1974 6.0 6.4 0.4
1975-2000 4.5 4.7 0.1
Panel B.
1850-1883 3.6 4.0 0.3
1884-1920 2.3 2.4 0.1
1921-1929 3.5 3.9 0.4
1930-1952 1.6 1.5 -0.1
1953-1958 4.5 4.9 0.5
1959-1974 7.0 7.4 0.4
1975-1986 4.5 4.5 0.0
1987-2000 4.6 4.8 0.2
Sources: See text and Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, “Physical Capital”.
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TABLE 3
CHANGE IN THE STOCK OF LAND, 1850-2000
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
1850-2000 0.2
Panel A.
1850-1950 0.2
1951-1974 1.0
1975-2000 -0.4
Panel B.
1850-1883 0.1
1884-1920 0.8
1921-1929 1.0
1930-1952 0.2
1953-1958 -2.2
1959-1974 1.0
1975-1986 -1.0
1987-2000 0.1
Sources: See text
TABLE 4
LABOR QUANTITY GROWTH DECOMPOSITION, 1850-2000
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Hours Hours per Occupied EAP per Pop 15-64 Population
worked occupied per EAP Pop 15-64 /Population
(H) (H/E) (E/L) (L/WAN) (WAN/N) (N)
1850-2000 0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6
Panel A.
1850-1950 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6
1951-1974 1.0 -0.4 0.3 0.4 -0.3 1.0
1975-2000 -0.4 -0.8 -0.6 0.2 0.4 0.4
Panel B.
1850-1883 0.6 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4
1884-1920 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6
1921-1929 1.8 -0.3 1.0 0.0 0.1 1.0
1930-1952 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.9
1953-1958 0.4 -0.6 -0.4 0.8 -0.3 0.8
1959-1974 0.6 -0.5 0.0 0.2 -0.2 1.1
1975-1986 -3.6 -1.5 -2.4 -0.8 0.4 0.7
1987-2000 2.4 -0.1 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.2
Sources: See text
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TABLE 5
LABOR QUANTITY, QUALITY, AND INPUT GROWTH, 1850-2000: ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
Jorgenson Approach Mincer Approach
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Labor Labor Labor Labor Labor
Quantity Quality Input Quality Input
[(I)+(II)] [(I)+(IV)]
1850-2000 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.9
Panel A.
1850-1950 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.7
1951-1974 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.9 1.9
1975-2000 -0.4 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.5
Panel B.
1850-1883 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.9
1884-1920 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.5
1921-1929 1.8 0.8 2.6 -0.1 1.7
1930-1952 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.2 1.0
1953-1958 0.4 1.2 1.6 0.9 1.2
1959-1974 0.6 1.1 1.7 0.9 1.5
1975-1986 -3.6 1.2 -2.4 0.8 -2.8
1987-2000 2.4 0.2 2.6 0.9 3.3
Sources: See text
TABLE 6
AVERAGE FACTOR SHARES, 1850-2000 (%)
(I) (III) (II)
Capital Land Labor
1850-2000 24.0 7.5 68.4
Panel A.
1850-1950 23.4 9.7 66.9
1951-1974 22.2 5.7 72.1
1975-2000 28.1 0.8 71.1
Panel B.
1850-1883 17.7 9.9 72.4
1884-1920 28.3 10.6 61.1
1921-1929 27.5 10.9 61.6
1930-1952 23.9 7.8 68.4
1953-1958 28.4 9.2 62.3
1959-1974 17.6 3.5 78.9
1975-1986 23.1 1.1 75.8
1987-2000 32.4 0.6 67.1
Sources: See text
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TABLE 7
SOURCES OF GROWTH (1850-2000): VARIABLE AND FIXED FACTOR SHARES AND
ALTERNATIVE LABOR QUALITY ESTIMATES
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
I. Variable Factor Shares Jorgenson Approach Mincer Approach
GDP Land Capital Capital Labor Labor TFP Labor TFP
Stock Quality Quantity Quality Quality
1850-2000 2.5 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.1 0.3 1.0
Panel A.
1850-1950 1.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2
1951-1974 6.5 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.7 0.8 3.7 0.7 3.8
1975-2000 3.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 -0.4 0.5 1.7 0.8 1.4
Panel B.
1850-1883 1.8 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.5
1884-1920 1.3 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
1921-1929 3.8 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.1 0.5 1.1 -0.1 1.6
1930-1952 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.4
1953-1958 4.7 -0.2 1.3 0.1 0.2 0.8 2.4 0.5 2.7
1959-1974 6.9 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.5 0.9 4.2 0.6 4.4
1975-1986 2.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 -2.8 0.9 3.4 0.7 3.7
1987-2000 3.5 0.0 1.5 0.1 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 -0.3
II. Fixed Factor Shares
Jorgenson Approach Mincer Approach
GDP Land Capital Capital Labor Labor TFP Labor TFP
Stock Quality Quantity Quality Quality
1850-2000 2.5 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.3 1.0
Panel A.
1850-1950 1.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2
1951-1974 6.5 0.1 1.4 0.1 0.7 0.7 3.5 0.6 3.6
1975-2000 3.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 -0.3 0.5 1.7 0.6 1.6
Panel B.
1850-1883 1.8 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.2
1884-1920 1.3 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3
1921-1929 3.8 0.1 0.8 0.1 1.3 0.5 1.0 -0.1 1.6
1930-1952 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.2
1953-1958 4.7 -0.2 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.9 2.6 0.6 2.8
1959-1974 6.9 0.1 1.7 0.1 0.4 0.7 3.9 0.6 4.0
1975-1986 2.5 -0.1 1.1 0.0 -2.5 0.8 3.1 0.6 3.4
1987-2000 3.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.6 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.1
Sources: Tables 1-6 and see text
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TABLE 8
TFP GROWTH, 1965-2000: ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
1965-1974 1975-1986 1987-2000
Myro 4.1 2.6
Suárez 3.8 1.6
Hofman (raw) 1.6
Hofman (adjusted) 0.4
Cebrián 4.2
Mas and Quesada* -0.6
Timmer, Ypma, and van Ark* 0.4
Our Estimates (variable factor shares) 3.7 3.4 0.2
Our Estimates (variable factor shares) (Mincer) 4.0 3.7 -0.3
Our Estimates (fixed factor shares) 3.3 3.1 0.6
Our Estimates (fixed factor shares) (Mincer) 3.6 3.4 0.1
Notes: * Excluding residential structures from capital input
Sources: Suárez, “Economías de escala”; Hofman, “Economic Development”: 256, 1973-89; Myro,
“Evolución de la productividad”: 1966-74; 1975-81; Cebrián, “Fuentes del crecimiento”: 1964-73; Timmer
and Van Ark, “Information and Communications Technology”; Mas and Quesada, nuevas tecnologías: 283,
1985-2002; for our estimates, see Table 7 and text.
TABLE 9
PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH AND ITS COMPONENTS, 1850-2000
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
(I) (II) (III)
Per Capita Hours worked GDP per
GDP /Population Hour Worked
1850-2000 1.9 -0.2 2.1
Panel A.
1850-1950 0.8 -0.1 0.9
1951-1974 5.5 0.0 5.5
1975-2000 2.6 -0.8 3.4
Panel B.
1850-1883 1.4 0.2 1.2
1884-1920 0.7 -0.3 1.0
1921-1929 2.8 0.8 2.0
1930-1952 0.0 0.0 0.0
1953-1958 3.9 -0.5 4.3
1959-1974 5.8 -0.5 6.3
1975-1986 1.8 -4.4 6.1
1987-2000 3.3 2.2 1.1
Sources: Col. (I), Table 1; rest, see text
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TABLE 10
SOURCES OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH (1850-2000): WITH VARIABLE AND FIXED
FACTOR SHARES AND ALTERNATIVE LABOR QUALITY ESTIMATES
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
Variable Factor Shares
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Jorgenson Approach Mincer Approach
GDP per Land Capital Labor TFP Labor TFP
hour worked Input Quality Quality
1850-2000 2.1 0.0 0.8 0.2 1.1 0.3 1.0
Panel A.
1850-1950 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2
1951-1974 5.5 0.0 1.2 0.6 3.7 0.6 3.8
1975-2000 3.4 0.0 1.4 0.4 1.7 0.6 1.4
Panel B.
1850-1883 1.2 -0.1 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.5
1884-1920 1.0 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
1921-1929 2.0 -0.1 0.6 0.5 1.1 -0.1 1.6
1930-1952 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.4
1953-1958 4.3 -0.2 1.3 0.8 2.4 0.6 2.7
1959-1974 6.3 0.0 1.2 0.9 4.2 0.7 4.4
1975-1986 6.1 0.0 1.9 0.9 3.4 0.6 3.7
1987-2000 1.1 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.6 -0.3
Fixed Factor Shares
Jorgenson Approach Mincer Approach
GDP per Land Capital Labor TFP Labor TFP
hour worked Input Quality Quality
1850-2000 2.1 0.0 0.8 0.3 1.0 0.3 1.0
Panel A.
1850-1950 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2
1951-1974 5.5 0.0 1.3 0.7 3.5 0.6 3.6
1975-2000 3.4 0.0 1.2 0.5 1.7 0.6 1.6
Panel B.
1850-1883 1.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.2
1884-1920 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3
1921-1929 2.0 -0.1 0.5 0.5 1.0 -0.1 1.6
1930-1952 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.2
1953-1958 4.3 -0.2 1.1 0.9 2.6 0.6 2.8
1959-1974 6.3 0.0 1.6 0.8 3.9 0.6 4.0
1975-1986 6.1 0.2 2.0 0.8 3.1 0.6 3.4
1987-2000 1.1 -0.2 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.1
Sources: Col. (I), Table 9; rest, Table 7 and see text
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TABLE A-1
ALTERNATIVE CAPITAL STOCK GROWTH, 1850-2000
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
(I) (II) (III)
Modified
Geometric Linear Depreciation
Depreciation Gross Net
(0.91/T;1.65/T) (1/T) (1/T)
1850-2000 3.5 3.6 3.5
Panel A.
1850-1950 2.7 2.8 2.8
1951-1974 6.0 5.4 5.4
1975-2000 4.5 4.6 4.6
Panel B.
1850-1883 3.6 4.3 4.3
1884-1920 2.3 2.4 2.4
1921-1929 3.5 2.7 2.7
1930-1952 1.6 1.3 1.3
1953-1958 4.5 3.7 3.7
1959-1974 7.0 6.5 6.4
1975-1986 4.5 5.0 4.9
1987-2000 4.6 4.3 4.3
Sources: Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, "Physical Capital"
Note: T is the life of each type of asset
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TABLE A-2
LABOR QUALITY GROWTH, 1850-2000: ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Mincer Equation Rate of Return
9 percent 7.2 percent
(Arrazola et al) (Alba and (Alba and (Mora)
San Segundo) San Segundo)
1850-2000 0.4 0.4 0.3
Panel A.
1850-1950 0.2 0.2 0.2
1951-1974 0.9 0.8 0.6
1975-2000 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7
Panel B.
1850-1883 0.3 0.2 0.2
1884-1920 0.3 0.3 0.2
1921-1929 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
1930-1952 0.2 0.2 0.1
1953-1958 0.9 0.7 0.6
1959-1974 0.9 0.8 0.6
1975-1986 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.7
1987-2000 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.8
Sources: Arrazola et al., “Returns to Education”; Alba and San Segundo, “Returns to
Education”; Mora, “Socioeconomic Background”. See text
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TABLE A-3
SOURCES OF GROWTH (WITH LAND INCLUDED AS PART OF CAPITAL) (1850-2000):
VARIABLE AND FIXED FACTOR SHARES AND ALTERNATIVE LABOR QUALITY ESTIMATES
(Annual average logarithmic rates %)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
I. Variable Factor Shares Jorgenson Approach Mincer Approach
GDP Capital Capital Labor Labor TFP Labor TFP
Stock Quality Quantity Quality Quality
1850-2000 2.5 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.8
Panel A.
1850-1950 1.4 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
1951-1974 6.5 1.5 0.1 0.7 0.8 3.5 0.7 3.6
1975-2000 3.0 1.3 0.0 -0.4 0.5 1.6 0.8 1.4
Panel B.
1850-1883 1.8 1.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1
1884-1920 1.3 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
1921-1929 3.8 1.4 0.1 1.1 0.5 0.7 -0.1 1.3
1930-1952 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.5
1953-1958 4.7 1.7 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.7 0.5 2.0
1959-1974 6.9 1.4 0.1 0.5 0.9 4.0 0.6 4.2
1975-1986 2.5 1.0 0.0 -2.8 0.9 3.3 0.7 3.6
1987-2000 3.5 1.5 0.1 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 -0.3
I. Fixed Factor Shares Jorgenson Approach Mincer Approach
GDP Capital Capital Labor Labor TFP Labor TFP
Stock Quality Quantity Quality Quality
1850-2000 2.5 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.8
Panel A.
1850-1950 1.4 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
1951-1974 6.5 1.9 0.1 0.7 0.7 3.1 0.6 3.2
1975-2000 3.0 1.4 0.1 -0.3 0.5 1.4 0.6 1.2
Panel B.
1850-1883 1.8 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.1
1884-1920 1.3 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2
1921-1929 3.8 1.1 0.1 1.3 0.5 0.8 -0.1 1.4
1930-1952 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.3
1953-1958 4.7 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.9 2.1 0.6 2.3
1959-1974 6.9 2.2 0.1 0.4 0.7 3.4 0.6 3.5
1975-1986 2.5 1.4 0.0 -2.5 0.8 2.7 0.6 3.0
1987-2000 3.5 1.5 0.1 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.6 -0.3
Sources: See text
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FIGURE 1
GDP, GDP PER CAPITA AND PER HOUR WORKED, 1850-2000 (1850 = 100) (semilog scale)
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FIGURE 2
CAPITAL STOCK AND INPUT, 1850-2000 (1850 = 100) (semilog scale)
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FIGURE 3
THE COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL STOCK, 1850-2000 (1995 Pesetas) (%)
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FIGURE 4
QUALITY OF CAPITAL, 1850-2000 (1850 = 1)
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FIGURE 5
LAND STOCK, 1850-2000 (1850 = 1)
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FIGURE 6
HOURS PER WORKER-YEAR, 1850-2000 (semilog scale)
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FIGURE 7
LABOR INPUT AND QUANTITY, 1850-2000 (1850=100) (semilog scale)
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FIGURE 8
LABOR QUALITY, 1850-2000 (1850=100) (semilog scale)
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FIGURE 9
FACTOR SHARES IN GDP, 1850-2000 (%)
